Monday, January 16, 2012

UK Ambassador: Yemen’s security, stability and unity is very important to the British government


By Mohammed al-Kibsi
Yemen’s Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi received the new ambassador of the United Kingdom to Yemen Hobton Nicholas and Deputy Ambassador Fiona pocket at his office in Sana’a on Monday.

Hadi welcomed the new British Ambassador, wishing him wished him success in his new duties.

The Vice President referred to the depth of relations between the two countries, reviewing the historical background of those relationships.

Hadi hailed British role during the crisis of Yemen and said was constructive and wonderful in the interest of the Yemeni people.

He said: "We look forward to the continuation of this situation to get out of this crisis in accordance with the GCC deal and its mechanism and in comply with the Security Council resolution No. 2014".
Hadi also reviewed with the UK Ambassador a number of issues related to implementation of the inGCC pact and ways of  translating it on the ground according to their specific provisions in time.


He stressed the need for alignment and solidarity for the success of the political settlement to bring Yemen out of these conditions and the current crisis.
The new British Ambassador expressed his pleasure to work in Yemen. He pointed out that he will do his utmost to contribute in bringing Yemen out of the current crisis.

He said: "Affairs of Yemen, security, stability and unity is very important to the British government" .. Noting that he phoned last week, Foreign Minister William Hague and advisor to British Prime Minister, who spoke about the importance of relations between Yemen and Britain, and what can be done to smooth and safe exit from the current circumstances .. He stressed that cooperation and partnership will be continued effectively, especially in the area of security, political and economic for the sake of prosperous, stable and safe Yemen.

The also reviewed the latest developments with regard to outrageous acts of terrorism committed by al Qaeda against Yemen and endangering its security and stability, especially what happened in the city  of Radaa and its surroundings in the province of al-Baidha, as well as the provinces of Abyan and Shabwa.

In this regard Hadi stressed on the responsibility of the international community for combating terrorism.

Abducted Norwegian in Yemen assures friends he is safe


 By Mohammed al-Kibsi


Exclusive
The abducted Norwegian friends’ said he messaged them several times and assured he was safe.
One of his friends in Yemen said that Gurgt had messaged het on Sunday and Monday and told her he was safe and that his kidnappers have been treating him well and letting him chew Qat.
The source said that Gurgt 34, old from Norway who works for the United Nation in Yemen told her he was safe and that his kidnappers allowed him to use his mobile, though he said they took his mobile from him when he makes many calls or messages.
He said he was somewhere in Marib province but could not affirm in which part.
Yemen security source said that Gurgt is part of a team of U.N. election observers scheduled to oversee Yemen's presidential elections in February.
Gurgt was kidnapped by some tribesmen from Marib province in Yemen’s capital Sana’a said security and diplomat sources on Sunday.
Yemeni security official said the U.N. worker was kidnapped from Sana’a city by armed tribesmen who transferred him to Marib province.
Marib province, 170 kilometers to the North East of Sana’a is one of the strongholds of al-Qaeda in the north of Yemen.
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ford Overland Andersen said the ministry was informed the 34-year-old Norwegian man was abducted early Sunday.
“U.N. worker was taken hostage by the Abidah tribe of Marib province. They were demanding the release of a tribesman who was arrested on charges of killing four Yemeni soldiers,” said the Norwegian official.



Sunday, January 15, 2012

Norwegian UN worker abducted in Yemen



By Mohammed al-Kibsi
A U worker from Norway was kidnapped by some tribesmen from Marib province in Yemen’s capital Sana’a said security and diplomat sources on Sunday.
Yemeni security official said the U.N. worker was kidnapped from Sana’a city by armed tribesmen who transferred him to Marib province.
Marib province, 170 kilometers to the North East of Sana’a is one of the strongholds of al-Qaeda in the north of Yemen.
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ford Overland Andersen said the ministry was informed the 34-year-old Norwegian man was abducted early Sunday.
“U.N. worker was taken hostage by the Abidah tribe of Marib province. They were demanding the release of a tribesman who was arrested on charges of killing four Yemeni soldiers,” said the Norwegian official.

AQAP captures more territories in central and southern Yemen



 By Mohammed al-Kibsi
Fighters of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have seized Rada’a town southeast of the capital Sana’a on Sunday
Security and local sources said the militants over raided the small police force that was assigned for insuring security affairs of the town when the heavy armed militants broke into the town.
 Rada’a town of al-Baydah province, 170 km south east of Sana’a is a historical city famous for al-Amryah citadel and mosque.
Al-Baidha province borders Abyan province that is controlled by AQAP.
Local sources said the al-Qaeda militants broke into Rada’a town on Saturday night, seizing the ancient citadel and mosque of al-Amryah.

Also Sunday, a Yemeni military official said AQAP militants executed two Yemeni soldiers in Abyan province.
He said that the soldiers were abducted two months ago while fighting al-Qaeda militants west of Zinjubar, the provincial capital of Abyan province.
AQAP has been taking advantage of nearly a year of internal turmoil over demands that President Ali Abdullah Saleh step down to take control of areas in Yemen’s south.

Islamist militants began seizing territory in the southern Abyan province last spring, solidifying their control over the town of Ja’ar in April before taking the provincial capital, Zinjubar, in May.
AQAP has changed the name of Ja’ar to Waqar.
Abyan province that is the homeland of Yemen’s vice president Abdu Raboo Mansour Hadi is semi-controlled by AQAP that even has made their own checkpoints on the roads linking Abyan to other provinces, raising their black flags.
Witnesses that were travelling from Aden to Hadramout provinces through Abyan said they passed through at least three checkpoints of AQAP.

Sunday, January 8, 2012

Al-Qaeda militants kill 2 troopers, Yemen army kill 6 militants


 By Mohammed al-Kibsi

At least a Yemeni officer and a soldier have been killed in clashes with al-Qaeda  militants in the south of the country, officials say.

The clashes took place in the suburbs of Zinjubar, capital of Abyan province on Saturday.
At least six insurgents were also killed, according to reports.

Militants linked to al-Qaeda, have exploited a security vacuum in the region after months of anti-government protests. The militants have raided Dubai Nights hotel in Aden killing at least three people and wounded over 24 last Wednesday.
Local sources from Aden said that the militants raided the hotel for dealing with prostitution and for selling alcohol.
A report released recently by Aba’ad (dimensions) foundation stated that the al-Qaeda and their allies of the  co called Ansar Sharia groups have extended their presence to Shabwa and Lahj provinces. The same report said that the al-Qaeda have changed the name of Ja’ar town that they have announced it as their Islamic Emirate to Wagar.
The group has also controlled the schools of the towns under their control and cancelled the National Education subject and replaced the national anthem to a religious chanting.    

The army is fighting to regain lost towns.

Reports of the latest violence varied. One unconfirmed account said up to five soldiers and a child had been killed.

An official quoted by Reuters said the army had shelled fighters from a group calling itself Ansar al-Sharia. A colonel and another soldier were killed and three other soldiers wounded, the official said.

Zayani stresses GCC support for Yemen’s stability


By Mohammed al-Kibsi
General Abdulatif al-Zayani, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reiterated GCC and international community support for putting an end to the Yemeni crisis according to the GCC initiative and the United Nations resolution 2014, said Saba news agency on Sunday.
Saba said that Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi received on Sunday a phone call from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General Abdullatif al-Zayani.

During the phone conversation, Hadi reviewed with al-Zayani the latest development in the Yemeni arena as well as the implementation progress in the Gulf initiative and the related achievements on the ground.

Al-Zayani accented the GCC and international community's support for putting an end to the Yemeni crisis according to the initiative and the United Nations resolution 2014.

Hadi valued highly the GCC States' interest in the Yemeni affaires and overcoming the crisis peacefully and democratically.

President Saleh decides to stay in Yemen



By Mohammed al-Kibsi 

President Ali Abdullah Saleh has decided to stay in the country and to postpone any visit to any other country, said Saba news agency on Sunday

The President made the decision during his meeting with a number of members of Parliament, Shura Council, the General Committee  of the General People Congress party, and the ministerial committee of the General People Congress (GPC).

Saleh's decision came in response to the appeals of the attendees, who demanded the President to refrain from paying any visit out of the country particularly in the difficult circumstances that required his presence in the country, underlining that the GPC and the Yemeni people want the President to remain in the country to participate fully in ending the crisis.

They stressed that the president traveling abroad would endanger the situation in Yemen and the GPC.
During the meeting, President Saleh reviewed with the GPC members in the Parliament, Shura Council, the General Committee and ministers reviewed the latest developments in the national arena pertaining to the implementation of the Gulf initiative and its executive mechanism signed in Saudi Arabia late in February.

The meeting called on the government and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and its partners to abide by the initiative as a whole and to be carried out according to its executive mechanism.

Japan grants US$ 1.14 million for Yemen elections


By Mohammed al-Kibsi

Japan offered 1.14 million US dollars for the purpose of supporting the fair and smooth implementation of the presidential election in the Republic of Yemen to be held on February 21, through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), said the Japanese Embassy in Sana’a in a press release issued on Sunday.



In its press release the Japanese embassy said that the upcoming  early presidential election is of critical importance as it is to elect a new president to succeed H.E. President Ali Abudullah Saleh, who has been in office for 33 years including the period when he was the president of North Yemen.

“The Government of Yemen has been making its utmost efforts to ensure the fair and smooth implementation of the election in cooperation with the international community. The Government of Japan has long been supporting Yemen’s nation-building efforts, and its assistance for this election is part of that,” said the press release

“Japan expects that the fair and smooth implementation of the presidential election will restore stability in Yemen, and that it will eventually contribute to the stability in the Gulf region as well,” according to the press release.





Yemen HR minister: government must talk to youths


By Mohammed al-Kibsi
Human Rights Minister Houriah Mashhour stressed on Saturday the importance of holding dialogue with youths and involving them entirely in the political process in the country, said Saba news agency.
Mashhour made the statement at the opening of a training course on reinforcing civic culture among youths, which is organized by the Middle East Organization for Social Development under the auspice of the Future Foundation.

The minister accentuated absolute refusal of the idea of exclusion no matter how different are the opinions.

The Human Rights Minister said that the civil state is only created by strengthening civic and community cultures, activating dialogue and exchanging views.

For his part, Middle East Organization for Social Development's head Abdullah Allaw that the government, civil and private organizations should focus on youths, who represent 65 percent of the community, and empower them politically, economically and socially.

During the training course, specialized trainers will lecture 30 youths on the civic culture, mechanisms of action and effectual participation in shaping the country's future, Allaw said.

The course will concentrate on enhancing the trainees' skills in forming youth discussion forums to be held monthly for a year to address their urgent issues and find solutions that will be referred to the concerned authorities, he added.

Qat diminishes Yemen water resources


Written By: Mohammed al-Kibsi
Still popular, qat chews provide an important forum for debate and dialogue in Yemen. Nearly every Yemeni chews; even old age and toothlessness fail to stop some. Taking a closer look at the agricultural, social, community, and health effects that this plant has on qat chewers will help us understand why it is so dangerous to Yemenis.


Qat is scientifically known as Catha edulis, a medium-sized shrub or tree known for its leaves, which release stimulating substances (amphetamines) when chewed. The qat plant is known by a variety of names, such as khat and gat in Yemen, chat in Ethiopia, jaad in Somalia, and miraa in Kenya and Tanzania. Although there are still minor disputes about where qat originated, today there is little argument about its common use in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Yemen. According to the al-Afif Cultural Foundation, it is estimated that about 70 to 80 percent of Yemenis between the ages of 16 and 50 years have chewed qat on at least one occasion. It has also been estimated that Yemenis spend about 14.6 million person-hours per day chewing qat. This is time that could be utilized in more productive ways such as engaging in work, extracurricular activities, studying or exercising.

Furthermore, recent researches  estimated that the amount of money spent on qat has increased from YR14.6 billion in 1990 to YR213.2 billion in 2010, and this figure continues to grow. Researchers have also estimated that families spend about 21 percent of their income on qat, although the real amount of money may be greater. One of the most serious economic side effects of the habit is the cost for consumers who lie at the lower end of the economic scale. The daily expense of qat can lead to less money being available for food and other basic family needs.

Qat’s popularity in Yemen has led to its excessive cultivation, depleting the country’s agricultural resources. It is estimated that 47 percent of the country’s water supply goes towards irrigating qat crops, with production increasing by about 10 to 15 percent every year. Water consumption is so high that groundwater levels in the Sana’a basin are diminishing and it is expected to dry out in just a little over 5 years.

One reason qat is cultivated so widely in Yemen is the high income it provides for farmers. Studies completed in 2001 estimated that the income from cultivating qat was about YR2.5 million per hectare, while it was only YR0.57 million per hectare for fruits. This is a strong reason for farmers to choose to cultivate qat over coffee, fruits, vegetables and grains. For this reason, between 1970 and 2000, the area on which qat was cultivated grew from 8,000 hectares to 103,000 hectares. However, these numbers are crude estimates and the real figures are believed to be much higher, according to agricultural officials and researchers.

Ideally, sustainable agriculture means farming in ways that provide a fair return for farmers’ work today while protecting or improving soil, water, and crop genetics for the use of future generations. It also means that local people and their communities are in control, that farming is based on cultural values, and that farming benefits the communities’ inhabitants economically, nutritionally and socially. But this will be difficult to achieve if qat continues to generate more return for the farmers than growing fruits, vegetables and grains.


Yemeni people devote much of their time to selling and buying qat.
Therefore, the Yemeni government should take measures to encourage farmers to move away from qat cultivation and instead advocate the planting of fruits, vegetables, coffee and grains. This can be achieved in a number of ways, including providing materials to those farmers who grow fruits and vegetables at subsidized costs and also placing a tax on qat. This tax would not only deter farmers from planting this crop, but more importantly, it would generate the necessary funds that could be used to off-set the losses that would be initially incurred when switching from qat farming to that of fruits, vegetables and grains.

Qat chewing is so popular amongst Yemenis that it is chewed at almost every gathering whether the festivities are large, such as wedding ceremonies, or small. The younger generations, mainly students, use qat as a stimulant to increase alertness and focus. Qat consumption is not something that is usually done once or twice a week; it is most commonly a daily practice.

In fact, qat consumers, according to several sources, chew for several hours daily. The amount of time spent chewing qat renders it a very serious issue. Today, despite the fact that many non-Yemenis from around the world drink Yemeni mocha, savored for its unique and bold taste, during social gatherings, Yemenis have instead used qat as a social substitute for this internationally-acclaimed beverage! Qat’s negative impact on Yemeni society is not only limited to the social, agricultural or economic realms, but more importantly it carries serious health risks. Qat chewing has been found to have some adverse effects on the human mind and body. It is for this reason that many religious scholars and clergymen from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries have prohibited the use and cultivation of this plant.

According to some research, qat can induce mild euphoria, and although this side effect is considered to be a positive as it stimulates conversation, there are many other effects that are clearly negative to qat chewers. Euphoria followed by mild depression is a common occurance in qat consumers, and these sudden highs and lows can be classified as manic. Further psychological consequences include hallucinations and nightmares.

Qat may also cause a loss of appetite, constipation, withdrawal symptoms, slight tremors and decreased libido. Research indicates that qat can cause ulceration of the gums and gastrointestinal tract, as wells as permanent teeth discoloration. Long term use can also precipitate renal and liver disease. Finally, many of the pesticides used to protect qat leaves from insects and bugs are not regulated; thus, excessive and improper usage has been associated with many types of cancers in qat chewers, including oral, gastrointestinal, liver, renal and bladder cancers, just to name a few.

In conclusion, although there are a few social gains in chewing qat there are far more detrimental effects. Qat chewing has a negative impact on Yemenis, both within Yemen and abroad. The time wasted chewing qat can be harvested in much better ways, including engaging in extracurricular activities, spiritual growth, studying and family functions. All of these alternatives have direct benefits that outweigh the few associated with qat chewing. If these alternatives are not encouraging reasons for the discontinuation of qat chewing, then the list of harmful effects that qat has on the individual, both mind and body, and the detrimental effects it has on the community at large are more than convincing.

To truly understand the negative impact that qat chewing has on Yemen as a nation, one needs to look no further than Yemen’s advancement in the educational, economic and professional realms in contrast to its gulf neighbors. Although qat is not the only reason why Yemen lags behind its neighboring counterparts, it has been a great impediment to Yemen’s advancement, and Yemen is better off without it.

Qat is the plague of Yemen and we need to work together on discouraging the habit of qat chewing and terminating its cultivation in order to ensure a more promising and fruitful future for the generations to come.

Sunday, January 1, 2012

A difficult road ahead for Yemen's political transition


Source: Foreign Policy
Posted By David W. Alley, Abdulghani  Al Iryani.

On Nov. 23, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh belatedly fulfilled his pledge to sign the GCC initiative. His signing potentially opened space for a peaceful transfer of power and far-reaching reforms. Yet, such a positive outcome is far from guaranteed and will largely depend on how domestic and international actors tackle three interrelated challenges: 1) preventing political infighting and spoilers from derailing the accord's implementation; 2) demonstrating tangible progress by providing security and basic services to Yemeni citizens; and 3) addressing two key weaknesses of the initiative, political inclusiveness and transitional justice.

First proposed in April 2011, the GCC initiative outlined a "30-60 Transition Plan" whereby the president would transfer power to his vice president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, after one month in exchange for immunity from prosecution. An opposition-led coalition government would then hold presidential elections two months after the president's resignation.

The agreement and accompanying implementation mechanisms signed on Nov. 23 retain this basic framework and timeline with important exceptions. The most notable among these is that Saleh will retain his position along with limited authorities until elections are held on Feb. 21, 2011. It also established a steering committee to oversee the restoration of security and the reintegration of military/security forces. Moreover, it greatly expanded on the original agreement by providing much needed clarification on questions of responsibility, sequencing, and oversight.

As currently defined, the transitional period is divided into two phases. The first lasts approximately three months, from the signing of the initiative until early elections on Feb. 21, 2011. During this time, the president delegates significant authority to Hadi, an opposition-led coalition government is established, and preparations are made for early presidential elections in which the vice president is the consensus candidate. Phase two begins after elections and consists of a two-year period devoted to national dialogue and constitutional reform.

All things considered, implementation is going relatively smoothly and political leaders are meeting key agreement benchmarks. Shortly following signature, the vice president issued a presidential decree calling for early elections. Then, on Dec. 10 , a national unity government was officially sworn in. The new government is headed by an opposition prime minister and ministerial portfolios are divided equally between the opposition and the president's party, the General People's Congress (GPC). In late November and early December, intense fighting in the flashpoint city of Taiz threatened to undermine the agreement, but by Dec. 4 local mediators secured a ceasefire. That same day, Hadi formed the Military Affairs Committee tasked with overseeing military/security de-escalation and restructuring. The committee began clearing streets of checkpoints in Sanaa and other cities on Dec. 17 and they plan to complete the task within one week. In short, the technicalities of the agreement are being implemented, yet many challenges remain, not least of which is a political environment with a lack of trust, desperate economic and humanitarian conditions, and significant inclusion and justice deficits in the agreement itself.

Political infighting and potential spoilers

The most critical challenge during phase one arguably will be keeping signatories moving in the same direction and holding potential spoilers at bay. This will be especially difficult in the military/security sector where progress has been comparatively slow and where the principle of "no victor, no vanquished" has left intact the two armed power-centers: the army and security forces controlled by Saleh's family on the one hand and a combination of defected army units controlled by General Ali Mohsen, tribesmen loyal to the al-Ahmar clan, and Islah-controlled militias, on the other.

Because both sides have maintained their positions, and each is deeply suspicious of the other, it would be imprudent to begin with fundamental military or security restructuring. Instead, the first priority should be on coordinated de-escalation. This appears to be happening, as the Military Affairs Committee has called for the removal of all checkpoints and roadblocks, the return of military units to their barracks and, a return of militias to their villages, all of which is to be completed by Dec. 24. If carried out, these measures will go far in restoring a sense of normalcy and security to the capital and other affected cities.

Assuming successful implementation, these steps could then set the stage for the kind of in-depth institutional restructuring that is necessary to establish civilian control over the military. This would entail standardized hiring, firing, and retirement practices as well as the regular rotation of military and security officers. By addressing such matters only after elections are held, the authorities can satisfy the widespread public desire to remove -- or at least clearly restrict the influence of -- certain military officers, while at the same time avoiding a precipitous approach that carries the potential of provoking a stalemate or, worse, armed confrontation, during the first phase.

So far, international scrutiny has focused almost exclusively on Saleh. That might have been understandable in the past, but it no longer can suffice. At one point or another, each of the armed groups mentioned above has been responsible for violence and contributed to an environment where human rights violations have occurred; going forward, either side could torpedo meaningful implementation of the agreement. Henceforth, the international community will need to closely monitor all parties and hold them accountable -- including publicly reprimanding and sanctioning those proven uncooperative.

In addition to military and security obstacles, the agreement could be undermined by political infighting both within the coalition government and among political parties. Already, the opposition has charged the GPC with a number of violations, including destroying documents in sensitive ministries like interior, finance, and justice. For its part, the GPC accuses the opposition of planning to violate the spirit of the initiative by, among other things, using its ministerial portfolios to proceed with investigations and prosecution of regime insiders. GPC supporters also complain that the opposition has yet to fulfill its commitment under the agreement to halt any direct support for the protests. To date, media outlets on both sides have made deeply inflammatory statements, stoking tensions and undermining the potential for cooperation.

Encouraging opposing parties to honor their commitments under the initiative and to work together will be a constant challenge. While international actors must play an important monitoring role in this respect, so too should domestic oversight agencies and civil society groups. Domestic tools exist, including the civil service law which governs hiring and firing within ministries. Enforcement of this law could minimize the risk of politicization of bureaucratic decisions and more clearly circumscribe political conflict. International monitors also could work closely with the Central Organization for Control and Audit in overseeing corruption. The abuse of public finance was a central grievance against the Saleh regime and many Yemenis are now concerned that the opposition will be tempted to commit similar abuses. As with the military/security sector, control over the public finances sector must be shared, transparent, and closely monitored to ensure balance and to reduce tensions during the transition. Independent youth activists, their strong misgivings about the GCC initiative notwithstanding, can play a role by pressuring the government as well as political parties to operate lawfully, transparently, and in keeping with their pledges of reform.

Delivering Security and Basic Services

A successful political transition will also depend on the government's capacity to produce tangible progress in the lives of ordinary citizens, notably in the realms of security and basic services. As noted, some improvement has been made on the security front through the Military Affairs Committee. Among other needs, the priorities should be returning electricity and water provision to pre-crisis levels as well as stabilizing the price of, and improving access to, diesel and petrol. Meeting these objectives will not be possible without substantial international financial assistance, which ought to be closely monitored by donors. Insofar as possible, donors should discourage reactivation of petrol and diesel subsidies, a step with potentially dire fiscal consequences.

Political Inclusiveness and Transitional Justice

The accord is not without critics, or flaws. At its core, it reflects a power-sharing arrangement between the president and his party, the GPC, on one hand and a coalition of political opposition parties, known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), on the other. Largely missing from the arrangement are several important stakeholders, including but not limited to: the Houthi rebels in the north; the southern movement; and an emerging constituency that was particularly active during the uprising, the independent youth. As they and others see it, the initiative is little more than a reshuffling of the deck, a new allocation of authority among elites that -- in one form or another -- have been implicated in the organization of power around Saleh. The principal beneficiaries, they point out, are the GPC and the most influential member of the JMP opposition, the Islamist Islah party, which also enjoys historical ties to the regime. Many also reject the immunity clause, arguing that those responsible for abuses should be investigated and brought to trial.

Establishment of a more inclusive process cannot wait until the onset of the national dialogue. Although reducing tensions among members of the political elite is both legitimate and necessary, a parallel track should be put in place to bring in the three aforementioned groups, lest their exclusion obstruct the government's ability to carry out early elections and a credible dialogue.

Fortunately, the implementation mechanism document mandates that the new government form a liaison committee to communicate with youth groups and it makes clear that the national dialogue in phase two must include all political actors and forces. Yet, thus far, inclusion efforts have taken a back seat to forging elite alliances at the political center between existing political parties. In many ways, the Houthi rebellion in the north, the southern movement, and the youth initiative uprising were a product of the failure of existing political parties and institutions to adequately aggregate and represent popular grievances and demands. As such, it is imperative that immediate action be taken to broaden meaningful inclusion.

Several steps could be taken in this respect. The government should open up direct lines of communication with these three constituencies in order to better understand their views on, as well as objections to, the structure and agenda of the national dialogue. It could also review the findings of existing government and or party-funded studies that have assessed the situation in the south and in Sadaa and consider implementing applicable recommendations. Important confidence-building measures for the south in particular may include: releasing remaining political prisoners (in a welcome step, the government released Hassan Ba-Aum, a prominent southern movement Hiraak leader who calls for southern independence, shortly after it was formed), investigating human rights abuses, removing certain controversial military and security officers, and more assertively facilitating humanitarian access to areas such as Abyan and Aden. Both the GPC and the opposition have been careful to ensure that southerners are well represented in the unity government. This is an important indication of good-will, but it is in no way a substitute for engaging with the southern movement and others regarding their priorities and preferences for the national dialogue.

The GCC initiative also suffers from the insufficient attention it pays to issues of transitional justice and reconciliation. Yemenis are sharply divided over the question of whether Saleh and his supporters ought to enjoy immunity. Many in the opposition insist that regime insiders must be investigated and prosecuted for crimes committed during the uprising; others believe that such an approach would distract the coalition government from its priorities, namely building a new state; still others (essentially Saleh backers), argue that the real criminals are on the opposition side and that individuals such as Ali Mohsen and Hameed al-Ahmar should be brought to trial.

Who should benefit from immunity and how to render justice are divisive, sensitive, and currently unsettled issues. Ignoring them, or putting them aside, risks undermining chances of a lasting political settlement. Still, signatories of the GCC initiative committed themselves to pass immunity legislation for the president and those who have worked with him. Qualms notwithstanding, the signatories should honor their pledge. However, this agreement does not in any way preclude thorough investigation of human rights violations and a serious national discussion regarding matters related to transitional justice. This discussion is essential to prevent cycles of revenge and to address the deeply-felt desire to expose unlawful behavior and compensate victims. In this respect, the country could build on a long national tradition that centers primarily on exposing the truth and compensating victims as opposed to punishing perpetrators. Ultimately, Yemenis will have to determine how to address their past, but it is best that this discussion begin now.

David W. Alley is a Lieutenant-Colonel in the U.S. Army (Retired), a retired Middle East Foreign Area Officer, and is currently the COO of Lime -- Abu Dhabi, a political risk advisory firm. Abdulghani al-Iryani is an independent political analyst based in Sanaa, Yemen.